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Successions of Toney presents a rich debate over the requirements
of form mandated for notarial testaments in the Louisiana Civil
Code. The case lays bare the encroachment of common law testaments into Louisiana courts and the possible erosion of the civil law
emphasis on adherence to legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Ronnie Robert Toney passed away on January 19, 2015.1 He
was predeceased by his wife, Jeanette Rena Toney. Both died testate, with both leaving their entire estates to Mrs. Toney’s brother,
Richie Glenn Gerding, in the event one predeceased the other. On
April 13, 2015, Mr. Gerding sought to file and probate both testaments.
*
J.D./D.C.L. (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth R. Carter for her
help with research and editing.
1. Successions of Toney, 226 So. 3d 397, 399 (La. 2017).
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Mr. Toney’s testament, dated August 2, 2014, consisted of three
numbered pages, to which an affidavit was attached. The first two
pages of the will were initialed in print by Mr. Toney in the bottom
left corner. The third page consisted of the testator’s signature and a
clause in which three witnesses certified that the testator signed the
will and declared it his last will and testament. The affixed affidavit
included a similar clause by which the testator verified that, in the
presence of witnesses, he signed and executed the testament freely
as his last will and testament. Following a similar clause by the witnesses is a certification by the notary that the testator “signed, swore
to and acknowledged” and the witnesses “subscribed and sworn to”
the affidavit. Notably, the affidavit included a space to mark the
“county” in which the testament was executed.2
On May 6, 2015, John Huey Pierce Jenkins, Mr. Toney’s uncle,
filed a petition to annul Mr. Toney’s testament, alleging that the notarial testament failed to comply with the requirements prescribed
by Louisiana Civil Code article 1577. In seeking to annul the testament, Mr. Jenkins alleged several deficiencies in the form of Mr.
Toney’s notarial testament. First, the testament lacked Mr. Toney’s
signature on each separate page. Rather, the first two pages were
initialed in print, a departure from article 1577(1)’s requirements.3
Further, the code-mandated attestation clause was in a form inconsistent with article 1577(2).4 The final deficiency alleged was that
the notary, witnesses, and testator were not in each other’s presence
at the time the testament was executed.5
Upon review of the testament, the trial court judge found the testament to be absolutely null for want of form for the reasons alleged
by Mr. Jenkins. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Upon application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Mr. Gerding
2. Id. at 399-400. The affidavit seems to have been of a standard form common in other states.
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577(1) (2018) (“the testator . . . shall sign his
name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page”).
4. Id. at art. 1577(2).
5. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 399.
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argued that the deficiencies found in Mr. Toney’s testament were
minor and that the testament was overall sufficiently compliant with
the formal requirements prescribed by the Civil Code.6
II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the prior
courts, holding that the testament significantly and materially deviated from the formal requirements set forth in the Civil Code.7 While
acknowledging that there is normally a general presumption in favor
of the validity of testaments and substantial burden of proof to rebut
it, the court adheres to the mandatory language contained in article
1573.8 The court found that the printed initials at the bottom of the
first two pages of the document did not satisfy article 1577’s requirements. As to the attestation clause, the court found that, even
taking all the various clauses found in the testament and affidavit in
aggregate, there was nothing substantially similar to the attestation
clause in article 1577 sufficient to find one present in the testament.
This case included two dissents and a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Johnson argued that the strict adherence to the codal requirements constitutes an elevation of form over function. In her view, in
the absence of an allegation of fraud, Mr. Toney’s intent should have
prevailed, and the attestation clause was sufficient for formal purposes.9 Justice Weimer also criticized the elevation of form over
substance, arguing that the majority ignored the clear testamentary
intent by refusing to piece together the elements of a valid attestation
clause. The court also ignored long-standing lower court decisions
in finding the initialing of the first two pages of the testament to be
a significant deviation from form.10 Justice Crichton concurred in
6. Id. at 401.
7. Id. at 407.
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1573 (2018) (“The formalities prescribed for
the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely
null.”).
9. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 409.
10. Id. at 410-411.
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the majority opinion but wrote to express his concern over the “proliferation of widely available and generic legal templates” that present major deviation from codal form requirements. He stated that it
is the court’s duty to uphold the law as it is absent legislative change
in order to prevent the “metastization” of legal error in codal interpretation.11
III. COMMENTARY
This commentary aims to address several issues raised in Succession of Toney. First, consideration is given to the dissent’s argument
that an allegation of fraud or something similar is necessary to
properly consider formal deficiencies in notarial testaments. Next
under consideration is the issue of “substantial compliance” with article 1577’s attestation clause requirement and recent developments
on the issue. Then, Justice Crichton’s concurrence will be further
addressed. Finally, a proposal will be made for a path to avoid absolute nullity by formal deficiency, based on trends in other civil
and mixed-law jurisdictions.
A. The Necessity of Alleging Fraud to Raise Issues of Form
In this case, both the appellate and Supreme Court decisions carried dissents arguing that, because no fraud was pled, the intent of
the testator should have prevailed over the formal deficiencies.12
While the desire to adhere to testamentary intent is a proper goal,
the willingness to ignore multiple formal deficiencies in the absence
of alleged fraud defeats the purpose of the code articles governing
notarial testaments.
It is accepted that the articulated purpose of testamentary formalities is to safeguard against, among other things, fraud and undue
influence.13 If this is the purpose, it follows necessarily that
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 411-412.
Id. at 401, 409.
KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
SERIES: SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 12.1 (2d ed., West 2009).
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deviation from these formal requirements is a threshold indicator of
fraud or something similar. As it relates to the actual testament, a
fault in form that materially deviates from those formal requirements laid out in the code articles necessarily indicates potential
fraud without the need for pleading it or providing evidence to support it. While this may be a somewhat strict interpretation of legislative intent, it is compatible with the language of the relevant articles.
As a practical matter, the parties challenging a facially deficient
testament may benefit from not having to allege fraud or similar
vices. Such allegations can cause a tremendous amount of family
conflict and lead to expensive, drawn-out litigation. Nullifying the
deficient testament based on form prevents any inquiry into issues
of potential fraud and allows a certain measure of judicial efficiency.
Based on these considerations, the majority in Toney ruled correctly
in affirming the decisions of the lower courts.
It is important to remember that, where a testament may fail as a
notarial form, it may still be upheld if it meets the formal requirements of another testamentary form.14 Given that Louisiana only allows for olographic and notarial testaments, a notarial testament that
deviates from the necessary form may still be upheld if it satisfies
the requirements for an olographic will as laid out in article 1575,15
which is not the case here.
B. Substantial Similarity in Art. 1577’s Attestation Clause Requirement
Louisiana Civil Code article 1577(2) provides a sample of a
proper attestation clause. This, however, is not required. Rather, an
attestation clause is accepted so long as it is “substantially similar”
to the form provided.16 In Toney, the court looks favorably upon the

14.
15.
16.

Id.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1575 (2018).
Id. at art. 1577(2).
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summary provided by the First Circuit in Succession of Brown,
which listed three necessary elements in an attestation clause:
(1) the testator signed the will at its end and on each separate
page, (2) the testator declared in the presence of the notary
and witnesses that it (the instrument) was his will, and (3) in
the presence of the testator and each other, they (the notary
and witnesses) signed their names on a specific date.17
So long as these elements are satisfied, the attestation clause is
substantially similar so as to withstand scrutiny under the article. In
approving this list of elements, the Supreme Court upholds the “substantially similar” language of article 1577 and rejects a strict adherence standard found in prior jurisprudence.
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued two decisions regarding “substantial similarity” in article 1577. In Succession of
Bruce, the testament at issue contained an attestation clause that
failed to state that the testament was signed by the testator “at the
end;” rather, it only stated that the testator signed “on each page.”18
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the lack of the phrase
“at the end” in the attestation clause constituted a material deviation
sufficient to nullify the testament based on “strict adherence.”19 In
so doing, the lower courts accepted the argument that an attestation
clause must strictly adhere to the language provided in article
1577(2).
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the strict adherence argument, finding that strict adherence is in direct conflict with
1577(2)’s “substantial similarity” language. Noting that the only defect in the attestation clause at issue was the lack of “at the end,” the
court looked to the legislative history of article 1577 and its statutory
predecessor, La. R.S. 9:2442. Prior to the codification of 1577, an
iteration of La. R.S. 9:2442 included sample attestation clause language stating that the will was signed “on each page,” rather than
17. Toney, 226 So. 3d at 405.
18. Succession of Bruce, No. 2020-C-00239, 315 So. 3d 193, 2021 WL
266390 (La. 2021).
19. Succession of Bruce, 289 So. 3d 121 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2020).
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“on each page and at the end.” The latter phrasing was added in 1980
as a matter of semantics rather than substantive change.20Accordingly, the court found that “on each page” necessarily indicated that
the testament was signed at the end and was therefore substantially
similar to the sample clause provided in article 1577(2).21
In Succession of Liner, issued on the same day as Bruce, the court
ruled that an attestation clause stating that the testator “signed” was
not substantially similar to the sample clause found in article
1579(2),22 invalidating the testament at issue. The court found that
“signed” “did not establish that the testament was signed at the end
and on every page” of the testament at issue, instead only certifying
that the will was signed at least once.23
These cases add some nuance to the Toney decision by delving
further into what constitutes “substantial similarity” to the codal requirements for the attestation clause. As the cases indicate, it is sufficient to state that the testament is signed on each page, as that inherently indicates the final page is signed at the end. However, it is
not enough to simply say that the testament is signed, as that only
guarantees that the document is signed at least once, be it on the final
page or any other page. These decisions also serve to rebut the contention that strict adherence is required in attestation clauses. Such
an interpretation of article 1577(2) goes directly against the “substantially similar” language found in the article. In ruling as it did in
these cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court upholds 1577(2)’s more
permissive “substantial similarity” requirement as opposed to a fundamentally incompatible strict adherence standard.

20. Succession of Bruce, 2021 WL 266390 at *3.
21. Id. at *4.
22. This article dictates the requirements for a notarial testament where the
testator is unable to read. Section 2 of this article provides for an attestation clause
similar to that found in art. 1577.
23. Succession of Liner, No. 2019-C-02011, 2021 WL 266394 (La. 2021).
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C. The “Metastization” of Legal Error in Notarial Testaments
As mentioned above, Justice Crichton concurred in the opinion
to raise the issue of the proliferation of generic testament formats
that, while permissible in common law jurisdictions, fail in light of
Louisiana’s formal requirements. This was plainly the case in
Toney, as the record supports that the testament in question followed
a common law format. As this issue is unlikely to go away any time
soon, it is worth further discussing the problems this issue presents.
Louisiana, like every civil law jurisdiction, recognizes legislation
and custom as the sources of law.24 As legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will,25 it follows that legislation should be
followed above all else. Articles 1573 and 1577 are such expressions
of legislative will and must be adhered to in the absence of other
legislation to the contrary. Accordingly, any notarial testaments that
materially deviate from article 1577 will be absolutely null in light
of 1573. To grant validity to deficient common law testamentary
formats is to undermine the civilian nature of Louisiana law by allowing judicial fiat to validate codal noncompliance.
To avoid such issues, perhaps further legislation is necessary. At
the very least, there needs to be a clear indication (beyond codification) to the public that Louisiana has specific formal requirements
in the preparation of notarial testaments. It is almost certain that one
is able to find a Louisiana-compliant testament format online.
The prevalence of this issue regarding attestation clauses also
speaks to a concerning trend among Louisiana attorneys and notaries. Article 1577 has been codified in the Louisiana Civil Code
since 1997; prior to that, it had existed as a creature of statute since
1952. The language has changed very little over its life, with only
small semantic alterations conducted when changes were made.
This article provides clear, unambiguous wording and a sample
clause. With such a clear requirement, usable language, and the
24.
25.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2018).
Id. at art. 2.
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penalty of absolute nullity for deviation, there is no valid reason for
the exclusion of a compliant attestation clause. The fact that this issue keeps coming up speaks to a lack of basic diligence in the drafting and notarizing of notarial testaments that rises to the level of
legal malpractice or notarial liability. Those parties to a testament
found null on these grounds should have a clear cause of action
against these attorneys or notaries who fail to comply with clear codal mandate.
D. Comparing Approaches to Formal Deficiency: Louisiana and
Quebec
In a recent Louisiana Law Review article, Professor Ronald J.
Scalise, Jr. noted that many civil law and mixed-law jurisdictions
are moving away from strict formalism in testamentary form.26 Specifically, many of these jurisdictions have been trending away from
absolute nullity as a consequence of deviation. While it is unnecessary to go into the weeds on the trend, it would be beneficial to compare Louisiana’s approach with that of Quebec, a similarly situated
mixed-law jurisdiction.
Article 1573 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as already observed,
requires that formal requirements must be satisfied on pain of absolute nullity. Quebec Civil Code article 713, an equivalent to article
1573, is similar to the extent that formal requirements must be satisfied; however, it does not have absolute nullity as the consequence
for failure to meet requirements.27 Rather, article 714 allows for a
testament to survive formal deficiency if it meets the essential requirements of the given form and if it “unquestionably and unequivocally contains the last wishes of the deceased.”28 By this article, a
notarial testament that fails for certain flaws in form can otherwise
be valid if 1) the essential aspects of the form are observed, and 2)
26. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Will Formalities in Louisiana: Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow, 80 LA. L. REV. 1331, 1352-56 (2020).
27. QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 713.
28. Id. at art. 714.
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it can be demonstrated that the testament indisputably contains the
testator’s intent.
As can be seen, the Quebec approach is more permissive than
Louisiana’s. It leaves a certain amount of discretion to judges in determining the validity of a testament and strikes a seemingly fair
balance between requiring legal form requirements and upholding
the testamentary intent of the testator. What remains unclear from
article 714 is what is defined as an “essential requirement.” The lack
of absolute nullity is certainly more forgiving than Louisiana’s near
“all-or-nothing,” strict formal requirements.
The comparison between the approaches of Quebec and Louisiana is drawn in order to demonstrate a possible path forward for a
more forgiving Louisiana law on notarial testament form requirements. Such an approach may be to the benefit of Louisiana testators. It is unclear how exactly article 714’s standards would deal
with attestation clauses but, as a purely scholarly matter, Louisiana
may wish to consider such an approach.

